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Abstract 
 
Women are found to be more risk averse than men (Fehr-Duda, 2006; Watson & 
McNaughton, 2007; Eckel & Grossman, 2008). Women are also different from men in their 
leadership styles and attitudes towards ethics and risks (Gul, Srinidhi & Tsui, 2007). These 
differences suggest that the presence of women is capable of reducing accrual management. Our 
empirical results show that the presence of women on the board and audit committee is not 
associated with accrual management. Hence, women do not appear to perform the accounting 
oversight role well.  
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1. Introduction 
 
  In the US, women represented 16% of the directors in 2006 (Spencer Stuart 2006 Board 
Diversity Report). In a survey conducted by the Malaysian Ministry of Women, Family and 
Community Development in 2007, only 5% of the board members in a sample of 50 listed firms 
were occupied by women. Previous findings, although mixed, generally provide evidence that 
women’s participation in top management is positively associated with firm performance (see for 
example Nguyen and Faff (2007) in Australia, Smith et al. (2006) in Denmark, and Erhardt et al. 
(2003) in the U.S).  
 
To date, very few research has been undertaken to observe if women’s participation in top 
management is able to mitigate acrual management. To our knowledge, only two studies were 
conducted to examine the association between board and audit committee characteristics, and actual 
earnings management practice based on reported financial figures. First is the work by Krishnan and 
Parsons (2008), and second, a study by Gul et al. (2007). Both studies examined American 
companies and provided evidence that the representation of women in top management is associated 
with reduced earnings management practice. However, no such study is found in other jurisdictions. 
To fill the missing gap, we feel that it is necessary that this study is conducted on Malaysian 
companies. Hence, it is the aim of this study to examine if the participation of women on the board 
of directors and audit committee would mitigate earnings management practice of companies in 
Malaysia.  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
  It is evident that rising to the top by women is blocked by a “glass ceiling” in which aspiring 
women could see where they might go, but, in reality, they might not be able to be there. It is a 
widely accepted perception that “In any given occupation, and in any given public office, the higher 
the rank, prestige or influence, the smaller the proportion of women” (Hansard Society (1990, p. 2). 
This perception has slowly changed. In the U.S, the proportion of female directors was only 4.7% in 
1987 but it rose to 13.6% in 2003 (Catalyst, 2003), and improved further to 16% in 2006 (Spencer 
Stuart 2006 Board Diversity Report). A similar pattern has also been observed in the UK where the 
proportion of female directors on UK FTSE 100 has increased from a mere 3.7% in 1995 to 8.6% in 
2003 (Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Vinnicombe and Singh, 2003). Considering that these developed 
nations are champions in promoting gender equality, the increase in women participation on board is 
still not promising. Smith et al. (2006) reported, in Norway, the proportion of women directors 
increased from 6% in 2000 to 22% in 2003. As at end of 2007, the proportion of women directors 
increased to 37% (Oslo, 2007).  
 
  In Asia, evidence on women directors is very limited. This is because in the Asian culture, 
women are expected to play supporting roles rather than the leading role. Even Japan, a developed 
nation, is still very far from other developed nations with respect to the appointment of women to the 
boards. In 1998, only 0.2% of the board seats in Japan were occupied by women (Corporate Women 
Directors International, 2009).  
 
  The issue of women’s participation in top management in Malaysia emerges because the 
educational level of women has improved tremendously in recent years. In 2006, about 60% of 
students in the government-assisted universities in Malaysia were females. Evidently, in 2006, 45.8% 
of women aged 15 to 64 were in the workforce and they represented 35.6% of the total workforce of 
10.6 million in Malaysia (Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, 2007a). 
Statistics also shows that 26.1% of the working women are professionals, legislators, senior officials, 
managers, technicians and associate professionals. Thus, the pool of potential and qualified women 
who could serve on the board is large. In its 2004-2007 Achievement Report, the Ministry of 
Woman, Family and Community Development (MWFCD) reported that the percentage of women 
appointed at the principal position levels (JUSA) in the public sector increased to 18% in 2004 and to 
25% in 2007. The percentage of women elected as parliament members increased from 4.5% in 1980 
to 9.6% in 2004 (MWFCD, 2007a). The percentage of female senators increased markedly from a 
mere 9.5% in 1980 to 33.3% in 2004 (MWFCD, 2007b). A survey by the MWFCD on a sample of 
50 Malaysian listed companies in 2007 reveals that the participation of women on the BODs from 
the year 2001 to 2005 was constant at about 10.2%. Surprisingly, the figure dwindled significantly to 
only 7.6% and 5.3% in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Statistics shows an increase of women’s 
representation on the boards of government-owned companies (GLCs), from 11% in 2005 to 14% in 
2007 (Ministry of Finance, 2008).  
 
  Gul et al. (2007) describe women in top management as having “trust building roles”. Unlike 
men, women are believed to show greater concern for interpersonal relationship and rely on rules of 
fairness. The successful new generation of women leaders show that they succeed by “drawing on 
the skills and attitudes they developed from their shared experience as women” (Rosener, 1990, p. 
119). While men adopt the “transactional” or command-and-control approach of leadership, women 
tend to adopt the “transformational’, interactive or the participative approach of leadership. Unlike 
men, women leaders are more interested in building relationships with their subordinates and they 
 
 
would rather be evaluated on the basis of employee satisfaction than on the basis of financial 
performance (Appelbaum and Shapiro, 1993).  
 
  Surveying fund managers in the U.S., Germany, Italy, and Thailand, Beckmann and 
Menkhoff (2008) found that women are more risk averse, tend to be less overconfident and are more 
likely to shy away from competition. Using laboratory experiment with monetary incentives, Fehr-
Duda (2006) found that women are risk averse than men. The finding is supported by Watson and 
McNaughton (2007) and Eckel and Grossman (2008). Since earnings management is associated with 
risks, we believe that women are less likely to be involved in earnings management. Gender 
socialization approach argues that men and women bring different values into their workplace that 
will subsequently shape their decisions and practices (Betz et al., 1989). Because men regard money 
and advancement as their successful factors, and see achievement as competition, Betz et al. (1989) 
argued that men are more likely than women to break rules or be less ethical. However, a number of 
empirical evidence indicates that men are more likely to engage in unethical behaviour (see for 
example Albaum and Peterson, 2006; and Betz et al., 1989). 
 
  Krishnan and Parsons (2008) determine if the participation of women in senior management 
predicts the quality of earnings. Multiple measures are used to proxy earnings quality. Gul et al. 
(2007) examine the association between female board membership and earnings quality. They 
measured earnings quality by using several measures. Both studies provide evidence that top 
management with female representation is associated with lower earnings management practice.  
 
  Drawing on the perspectives of leadership, ethical values and attitudes towards risks 
discussed above, and prior empirical evidence, we hypothesise the following:  
 
H1:  Boards of directors with women representation are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. 
 
H2:  Audit committees with women representation are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. 
 
 
3. Research Methods 
 
  In view of several initiatives taken by the government with the policy on women participation 
and the revision of the Malaysian Code in 2007, data for the year 2008 are collected from all 
companies listed on the main board. To test the hypotheses, the following regression model is 
employed: 
     n 
DACC = α + β1WOMDIR + β2WOMAC + ∑ βiX + ε                      (1) 
                                                                     i=2 
Where, 
 
DACC = Discretionary accruals, 
WOMDIR = 0 if a board has no woman director and 1 if it has at least one woman director. 
WOMAC  = 0 if an audit committee has no woman director and 1 if it has at least one woman 
director and 
 
 
 
 
X = a vector of control variables which include board independence (BODIND), board 
size (BODSIZE), board ethnicity (BODETHNIC), company size (COMSIZE), 
profitability (ROA), gearing (GRG) and auditor size (AUDITOR). Board 
independence is measured by the proportion of independent directors on the board, 
board size by the total number of board members, and company size by natural log of 
total assets. As for auditor size, a score of 1 is given if a company is audited by a Big-
4 auditor, and a 0 otherwise. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. GRG is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets and gearing ratio is a measure of risk of breaching 
debt covenants.  
 
Board ethnic diversity is measured using Simpson’s diversity index as defined by Gibbs and 
Martin (1962) (cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki /Diversity_index#References) for use in 
sociology as: 
                                                                                                         (2) 
Where, 
p = proportion of individuals or objects in a category 
N = number of categories. 
 
A score of 0 means all directors are of the same ethnic group. If there is 30% Malays, 50% 
Chinese and 20% Indians for example, the score will be 0.62. The highest score is not 1; it will be 
0.5 if there are two ethnic groups, and 0.67 if there are 3 groups, and 0.75 if there are four groups. 
Earnings management is measured by the abnormal (or discretionary) accruals, which is computed 
using working capital accruals (also referred to as current accruals). Manipulation through working 
capital accruals is very attractive as it has no direct cash flow consequences and is relatively difficult 
to detect and easier for managers to manage (Xie, Davidson III and DaDalt, 2003). Further, 
managers have greater discretion over to manage current accruals than long-term accruals (Guenther, 
1994; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998). This working definition of discretionary accruals is different 
from Jones’ (1991) model, which used total accruals that include depreciation of fixed assets. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) argued that the Jones’ (1991) model is more susceptible to 
manipulation than the non-working capital accruals. In addition, Beneish (1998) argued that the use 
of long-term accruals, such as depreciation, for manipulation is more transparent and economically 
implausible. Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) found that the model was almost indistinguishable 
from the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1995) modified version in detecting the levels of earnings 
management. Hence, total working capital accruals (WCA) are defined as the change in non-cash 
working capital and is computed as below: 
 
WCAi,t = ∆(CAi,t–CASHi,t) - ∆(CLi,t–CBORRi,t)      (3) 
 
where CA is current assets, CASH is cash and cash equivalents, CL is current liabilities and CBORR 
is borrowings repayable in one year, all of which are scaled by lagged total assets. The total working 
capital accruals would then be partitioned into discretionary accruals (DACC) and nondiscretionary 
accruals (NDACC) and a cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate 
the parameters (α1, α2 and α3) needed to estimate discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary 
accruals. The parameters (α1, α2 and α3) are estimated for each industrial sector of the Bursa 
Malaysia. Following Subramanyam (1996), industries which have less than six observations are 
excluded from the analysis.  
 
 
 
WCAi,t/TAi,t-1 = α1+ α2(1/TA I,t-1) + α3(ΔREVi,t/TA i,t-1) + ε i,t          (4) 
Where: 
TA = Total assets 
REV = Total sales 
i and t = Firm and year 
 
The nondiscretionary accruals (NDACC) are the predicted component of the regression while the 
residual of the regression represents (i.e. ε) the discretionary accruals (DACC). Thus: 
                     ^      ^                      ^ 
NDACCi,t = α1 + α2(1/TA it-1) + α3(ΔREVi,t- ΔRECi,t /TA I,t-1) and          (5)  
 
DACC I,t   = WCA i,t / TA i,t-1 – NDACCi,t             (6) 
 
The interest of this study is on accrual management, rather than its direction. Thus, consistent 
with prior studies (e.g. Barton, 2001; Klein, 2002), we use the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for accrual management.  
 
 
4. Results  
 
A total 855 companies were listed on the Main and Second Boards of Bursa Malaysia; 
however, after omitting companies with insufficient data; those designated under PN17 (i.e. 
classification for financially distressed firms); those under finance, REITs and closed fund sectors; 
those belonging to sectors that comprise of less than six companies, we ended up with 639 
companies. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the study. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (n=639) 
 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
 
Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Skewnes
s 
Discretionary Accrual (DACCmj)  -5.4217 1.56578 -0.0961 0.3335 -6.54023 
Discretionary Accrual 
(DACCwacc) 
Board Independence (BODIND) 
-1.0755 
0.11 
1.02468 
0.92 
0.0445 
0.4439 
0.9837 
0.1207 
0.06975 
0.793 
Board size (BODSIZE) 3 17 7.46 1.858 0.889 
Ethnic Diversity (ETHNIC) 0 0.76 0.3825 0.1799 -0.653 
Firm Size (LnASSET) 10.04 18.07 12.884 1.3438 00862 
Return on assets (ROA)  -0.88 0.74 0.0320 0.9560 -0.643 
Leverage (LEV) 0.48 176.81 4.0350 8.0920 16.161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Dummy variables 
 
Variable Frequency of “0” Frequency of 
“1” 
Mean 
Presence of female on Board 
(WOMBD)    
365 (57%) 274 (43%) 0.4288 
Presence of female on Audit 
Committee (WOMAC) 
530 (83%) 109 (17%) 0.1706 
Auditor (BIG4) 277 (43%) 57 (57%) 0.57 
        
Results in Panel B of Table 1 shows that 43% of the sample firms have women on their 
boards. The practice of appointing women to sit on the audit committee is not prevalent; only 17% 
firms appo int women to their audit committees and less than half of those companies with women on 
their boards appoint women to their audit committees (i.e. 40%). Ethnic diversity is found to be 
moderate as shown in panel A of Table 1 where the average score is 0.38, i.e. the majority of the 
boards have directors from two ethnic groups, i.e. Malay and Chinese directors dominate board 
memberships. Table 2 presents the results from regression analysis. 
 
Table 2 Regression analysis results (n=639) 
 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient Std. error T value Sig. 
Constant ? 1.556 0.425 3.361 0.000*** 
WOMBD - -0.055 0.092 -0.591 0.277 
WOMAC - -0.073 0.120 -0.605 0.273 
BODIND - -0.005 0.332 -0.016 0.490 
BODSIZE ? 0.016 0.023 0.712 0.238 
ETHNIC§ ? 0.018 0.041 0.449 0.326 
LnASSET + -0.119 0.033 -3.608 0.000*** 
ROA§ - 0.074 0.043 1.695 0.045** 
LEV§ + -0.157 0.044 -3.559 0.000*** 
BIG4 - -0.104 0.080 -1.290 0.09* 
Adj. R square  0.037    
F- statistic  2.717    
Sig.  0.004***    
* Significant at 0.10 level (one-tailed); ** Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed), *** Significant at 0.01 
level (one-tailed). 
§ normalized using the Van de Waerden formula. 
 
The presence of women on the board and audit committee does not have any impact on 
accrual management. This evidence thus is not consistent with Krishnan and Parsons (2008) and Gul 
et al. (2007). Gul et al. (2007) find that the presence of women on the boards is associated with 
higher stock prices, which implies higher earnings quality. However, the findings are consistent with 
Abdullah and Ku-Ismail (2011) and Ku-Ismail and Abdullah (2011) where both of the studies find 
that women on the board are not associated with higher firm performance. Thus, the presence of 
women does not help in mitigating accrual management; rather their presence makes no difference in 
terms of accrual management.  
 
 
 
Board independence and board ethnicity are also not associated with earnings management. 
Abdullah and Mohd Nasir (2004) also did not show any association between board independence and 
accrual management among Malaysian listed firms. Similarly, Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali 
(2006) also find that board independence and board ethnicity are not associated with earnings 
management. Likewise, Hashim and Devi (2009) find that there is no significant relationship 
between board of directors’ independence and earnings quality. In an earlier study, Abdullah (2004) 
also documents that board independence and firm performance are not related. Thus, taken all the 
evidence together, it does indicate that board independence and board ethnicity are not related to 
board performance, either in earnings management mitigation or improving the firm financial 
performance.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our results show that the presence of women on the board is not associated with the level of 
accrual management. Therefore, based on the findings, women directors on the board and women on 
the audit committee are not able to constraint accrual management. While the evidence indicates that 
women on the boards and audit committees do not constraint the level of earnings management, their 
importance could not be ignored. As more women being appointed to the board and the audit 
committee, their voice will become stronger. Further, as they become more experienced as directors, 
they will become more effective in discharging their duties. In order to justify their appointment, 
women directors need to improve themselves and show a good example as a testimony of their 
capability. Consequently, the chances of more women being appointed to the board will increase as 
well. The initiative taken by the government in increasing the number of women to hold 
directorships in listed firms should be seen as a very important move as an attempt to break the 
“glass ceiling”. In fact, in Norway and Spain, the appointment of women to the boards is done 
through law. But the initiative or enactment is not enough if women directors fail to perform their 
duties effectively. 
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